3D Secure is the payment industries Internet authentication standard. The Visa implementation is known as Verified by VISA and MasterCard is known as MasterCard SecureCode. When a cardholder enrolls for 3D Secure they get a password associated with their card. From this point on, when they visit a site that supports 3D Secure they will be prompted to enter the password to verify their identity. 3D Secure shifts the liability for fraudulent transactions from the Merchant to the cardholders issuing bank so this is a strong incentive for Merchants to adopt the standard.

3D Secure allows the cardholder to create a new password if they forget their current password. The manner in which this forgot password functionality is implemented seriously undermines 3D Secure and its use as an Internet authentication standard.

I am a frequent online shopper but I rarely come across sites that support 3D Secure. Recently I was purchasing some Skype credit and after entering my card details I was presented with a screen indicating that I had to verify my payment before I could proceed. 

After clicking on the 'Verify payment' button I was prompted to enter my 3D secure password. 

Rather than enter my password I clicked on the 'Forgot your password?' link. I have blocked out my login name in the above screen-shot but it was displayed as static text.  After clicking the 'Forgot your password?' link I was presented with the Verified by Visa 'Forgot Your Password - Identification' form.

Here I was prompted to enter the following information:

• The 3 digit security code on the back of my card, known as the Card Verification Code (CVC).
• The credit card expiry date.
• Cardholder Name as it appears on the card.
• Cardholder date of birth.

To my surprise after successfully entering all of this information a 'Create Password' form was displayed.

Here I am able to create a new password to be associated with my credit card for 3D secure transactions. It is worth noting that the password complexity rules enforced for the 3D secure password would not necessarily produce a password that one would regard as complex. The password must contain between 8 and 32 characters, contain at least one number and one letter. Once I created a new password I was then proceed to complete my purchase. Later I received an email from MBNA confirming that I had updated my 3D Secure account profile.

So what is the problem?

There are two fundamental flaws with the 3D Secure 'Forgot Password' process.

1. The information required to change the password.
2. The method by which the cardholder is notified of the password change.

1. The information required to change the password

Three out of the four pieces of information required to change the 3D secure password are available on the Visa card.

• The 3 digit security code on the back of my card, known as the Card Verification Code (CVC).
• The credit card expiry date.
• Cardholder Name as it appears on the card.

If someone is attempting a fraudulent transaction they will have already provided the CVC and the expiry date earlier in the transaction. There is a good chance they also have the cardholder name but if not they can easily determine it from the 'Login Name' displayed on the initial 'Verify Payment' view. The final piece of information required is the cardholders date of birth and if the cardholder has an online presence (e.g. Facebook, Bebo, LinkedIn etc.) then this is not exactly difficult to determine.

2. The method by which the cardholder is notified of the password change

The email to notify me that my password had changed came from mbna@securesuite.co.uk. The email contains links to a different domain www.mbna.3dsecurecard.ie/visa than that of the email. The combination of these two points make the email look like a phishing email. This is exactly the sort of email that we as security professionals educate people to ignore. Changing your 3D secure password is a pretty big deal yet the email does not mention that the password has been changed only that the 3D secure account profile has been updated.

3D Secure is often viewed as the online version of Chip and PIN. Imagine if this 'Forgot password' process was applied to Chip and PIN in the offline world. When paying for a purchase at a POS device you would have the option 'Forgot PIN'. Selecting this would allow you to reset your PIN by entering the CVC, expiry date, cardholder name and cardholder date of birth. This scenario sounds ridiculous because it is. This would never happen offline so why implement such a process online where there is even greater potential and risk of fraud?

Dave

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AIB have reported that 100,000 customers have been targeted with phishing attacks over the past week. It is understood that this scam is originating from Taiwan. AIB customers are receiving fake emails that claim to be from AIB. These emails are requesting confidential details relating to the customers online banking. Some of the emails even contain a link which sends the customer to a fake website that looks identical to the official AIB online banking website. This fake website requests confidential information from the customer such as their full 5 digit Personal Access Code and all 100 Code Card numbers.

This is not the first time that AIB has been hit with such attacks but this recent attack represents a 300pc rise on previous figures. A specialist company hired by AIB has already closed down 300 fake sites in the first six months of the year. AIB has issued a detailed warning to customers, you can find it in their Security Centre.

Here is a screenshot of one of the phishing emails.

This is the sort of text that I would expect to find in a phishing email. The next two examples show that attackers are attempting to use awareness of the phishing attacks to their advantage.

"Due to the high number of fraud attempts and phishing scams, it has been decided to implement EV SSL Certification on this Internet Banking Website. Please Update your account to the new EV SSL certification by Clicking here."

"AIB is pleased to notify our Online banking customers that we have successfully upgraded to a more secure and encrypted SSL servers to serve our esteemed customers for a better and more efficient banking services in the year 2009. To validate your online banking account click on Update Online Banking."

Awareness of online phishing attacks has improved but the attackers have also upped their game. Previously these type of phishing attacks would have requested customers to email their details. Now the attackers are producing websites that look identical to the official sites. Their phishing attacks are actually emails warning against the scam that they are attempting to carry out. If you are not Internet savvy then I can see how you might get fooled by one of the above. It needs to be made clear to customers that they must never act on any emails requesting personal information even if they appear to be from your bank.

Dave

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