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Industry News and discussions relating to Online Payments and Application Security.
Tags >> passwords
Aug 31
2010

Visa release Top 10 Best Practices for Securing Payment Applications

Posted by Dave in web development , Visa , security , PCI DSS , payment processing , passwords , online payments , news

credit card data securityVisa have published a set of 10 best practices for application vendors, integrators and resellers that implement, install or manage payment-related systems on behalf of merchants. The best practices are set to compliment the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS). The PA-DSS was originally developed by Visa before being embraced by the industry as the PA-DSS.

"The PA-DSS provides guidance for developing secure software, while Visa's Best Practices for Payment Application Companies represents a natural companion, providing guidance on how to securely install that piece of software," said Eduardo Perez, Head of Global Payment System Security, Visa Inc.

The 10 best practices are as follows:

  • Perform background checks on new employees and contractors prior to hire.
  • Maintain an internal and external software security training and certification curriculum.
  • Adhere to a common software development life cycle across payment applications.
  • Ensure that newly released payment application versions are Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS) compliant.
  • Conduct application vulnerability detection tests and code reviews against common vulnerabilities and weaknesses prior to sale or distribution.
  • Actively identify payment application versions that store sensitive authentication data and/or retain critical security vulnerabilities, and notify all affected customers.
  • Maintain customer service level agreements stating that only PA-DSS compliant payment application versions will be sold and supported.
  • Implement an installer, integrator and reseller training and certification program that enforces adequate data security processes when supporting customers.
  • Adhere to industry guidelines for data field encryption and tokenization and PAN elimination across payment applications that use these technologies.
  • Support capability of dynamic data solutions across payment applications


You can find more information over on the on Visa website.

 

Dave

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Oct 27
2009

Fundamental flaw with 3D Secure

Posted by Dave in Visa , security , Phishing , passwords , online payments , MasterCard , Chip and PIN , Application Security , 3D Secure

verified by visa logo3D Secure is the payment industries Internet authentication standard. The Visa implementation is known as Verified by VISA and MasterCard is known as MasterCard SecureCode. When a cardholder enrolls for 3D Secure they get a password associated with their card. From this point on, when they visit a site that supports 3D Secure they will be prompted to enter the password to verify their identity. 3D Secure shifts the liability for fraudulent transactions from the Merchant to the cardholders issuing bank so this is a strong incentive for Merchants to adopt the standard.

3D Secure allows the cardholder to create a new password if they forget their current password. The manner in which this forgot password functionality is implemented seriously undermines 3D Secure and its use as an Internet authentication standard.

I am a frequent online shopper but I rarely come across sites that support 3D Secure. Recently I was purchasing some Skype credit and after entering my card details I was presented with a screen indicating that I had to verify my payment before I could proceed. 

 

Verified by Visa Verify Payment page

 

After clicking on the 'Verify payment' button I was prompted to enter my 3D secure password

 

Verified by Visa Enter 3D Secure Password Page

 

Rather than enter my password I clicked on the 'Forgot your password?' link. I have blocked out my login name in the above screen-shot but it was displayed as static text.  After clicking the 'Forgot your password?' link I was presented with the Verified by Visa 'Forgot Your Password - Identification' form.

 

 

The Forgot Password indentification page for Verified by VISA

 

Here I was prompted to enter the following information:

  • The 3 digit security code on the back of my card, known as the Card Verification Code (CVC).
  • The credit card expiry date.
  • Cardholder Name as it appears on the card.
  • Cardholder date of birth.


To my surprise after successfully entering all of this information a 'Create Password' form was displayed.

 

 

The Create Password page for Verified by VISA and 3D Secure

 

Here I am able to create a new password to be associated with my credit card for 3D secure transactions. It is worth noting that the password complexity rules enforced for the 3D secure password would not necessarily produce a password that one would regard as complex. The password must contain between 8 and 32 characters, contain at least one number and one letter. Once I created a new password I was then proceed to complete my purchase. Later I received an email from MBNA confirming that I had updated my 3D Secure account profile.

 

Email from 3D Secure indicating that my profile has been updated

 

So what is the problem?

There are two fundamental flaws with the 3D Secure 'Forgot Password' process.

  1. The information required to change the password.
  2. The method by which the cardholder is notified of the password change.

 

 

1. The information required to change the password

Three out of the four pieces of information required to change the 3D secure password are available on the Visa card.

  • The 3 digit security code on the back of my card, known as the Card Verification Code (CVC).
  • The credit card expiry date.
  • Cardholder Name as it appears on the card.


If someone is attempting a fraudulent transaction they will have already provided the CVC and the expiry date earlier in the transaction. There is a good chance they also have the cardholder name but if not they can easily determine it from the 'Login Name' displayed on the initial 'Verify Payment' view. The final piece of information required is the cardholders date of birth and if the cardholder has an online presence (e.g. Facebook, Bebo, LinkedIn etc.) then this is not exactly difficult to determine.

 

2. The method by which the cardholder is notified of the password change

The email to notify me that my password had changed came from mbna@securesuite.co.uk. The email contains links to a different domain www.mbna.3dsecurecard.ie/visa than that of the email. The combination of these two points make the email look like a phishing email. This is exactly the sort of email that we as security professionals educate people to ignore. Changing your 3D secure password is a pretty big deal yet the email does not mention that the password has been changed only that the 3D secure account profile has been updated.

3D Secure is often viewed as the online version of Chip and PIN. Imagine if this 'Forgot password' process was applied to Chip and PIN in the offline world. When paying for a purchase at a POS device you would have the option 'Forgot PIN'. Selecting this would allow you to reset your PIN by entering the CVC, expiry date, cardholder name and cardholder date of birth. This scenario sounds ridiculous because it is. This would never happen offline so why implement such a process online where there is even greater potential and risk of fraud?


Dave

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